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Abstract. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), such as pro-environmental
behaviour and fair trade, is a kind of normative behaviour by private
companies to provide a quasi-public good. We study dissemination mech-
anism of CSR with a multi-agent model in which corporation agents and
consumer agents interact with each other. We show that the mechanism
to disseminate CSR is a positive feedback between the corporations' pop-
ularity seeking behaviour and the consumers' social learning in which
CSR-seeking preference is evaluated according to both the local average
of the preferences of surrounding consumers and the global average of the
investment in CSR by all corporations. We also discuss an institutional
design to establish CSR from an objectionable social state.
Keywords. CSR (corporate social responsibility), Quasi-public good,
Institutional design, Positive Feedback, Multi-agent simulation
1 Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is to take responsibility by organizations
including private companies for the eect of their activities on all stakeholders
such as customers, employees, shareholders, investors, communities and so on. A
typical CSR activity is pro-environmental behaviour. CSR is a kind of normative
action by private companies and is considered as an enlightened movement,
since such activity must contribute to sustainability. From economic theoretical
viewpoint, however, it is said that CSR is inecient and impossible to maintain
in a competitive market. If we consider CSR is an eective means for attaining
sustainable society, we need to know a scheme to disseminate and to establish
CSR activities in our society. Further, considering the scheme, both theoretically
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and empirically, may lead us to an understanding of a method to make agents
behave normatively.
In this paper, we study dissemination mechanism of CSR activities using
a multi-agent simulation. We think of CSR as an institution. Here we use the
term institution in Veblen's sense, namely an institution is a habit of thought
common to the majority of individuals in a society [1]. A habit of thought is a
kind of a value or a preference. In order to establish CSR activities in a society,
stakeholders must have value/preference that CSR activities are nice or agreeable
for them in spite of demerit such as higher prices of private goods. Although
preference of people must change in order to disseminate CSR, preference is
taken as xed in the standard economic theory. Thus, we consider a multi-agent
system for exible modelling of agents' thought and behaviour.
2 Modelling CSR
2.1 Conceptualization of CSR
Before making a multi-agent model of CSR, we need to conceptualise CSR itself.
Here we look at CSR as to provide both a private good and a quasi-public good
by companies in their activities. A quasi-public good means the following two.
{ Consuming the good by any individuals is not excluded (non-excludability)
and one's consumption lessens the benet of others' consumption (rivalness).
Global environment is an example.
{ A good produces private benet in addition to social benet. Donation is an
example, in which we can feel satisfaction which is a private benet.
2.2 Multi-agent modelling of CSR dissemination
We describe an outline of our multi-agent model. In the model, there are two
types of agents, corporations and consumers, both are aligned in two-dimensional
planes, respectively. The two-dimensional planes are models of relational space
of the agents, not physical/geographical spaces.
The corporations produce private and quasi-public goods simultaneously.
They have strategies to decide ratios of invest in the quasi-public goods, i =
[0; 1], called \invest ratio". The higher the invest ratio of a corporation is, the
higher the price of the corporation's product is. The dissemination of CSR in
this model is dened as follows: most corporations are going to take very high
value of the invest ratio.
Each consumer buys a product of a corporation. The consumers have pref-
erences that decide the ratio of importance of the quasi-public good to the price
of the private good, denoted by j = [0; 1] and called \importance ratio". Each
consumer chooses one corporation according to his/her importance ratio, where
he/she is likely to adopt a corporation having the similar value of the invest ratio
to that of his/her importance ratio. This choice is not always exact. We use the
Boltzmann distribution in order to take probabilistic choice into account.
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The corporations change their strategies according to the popularity share,
that is, how they are adopted by the consumers. They try to copy the invest
ratio of the most popular corporation in their vicinity (8 agents). This adoption
is also not exact. A normal random noise with 0 mean and 0.1 standard deviation
is added to the original value.
Concerning the preference of consumers, we investigate four models, one is
xed and three adaptive:
1. xed preference
2. income standard
3. local standard
4. glocal standard (glocal means global + local)
Each consumer evaluates his/herself and surrounding consumers (8 agents) ac-
cording to a standard, which is dierent point among the three adaptive prefer-
ence models.
In the second model, the consumers refer to the income as the standard.
Since a consumer with higher value of the importance ratio buys a product with
higher price, his/her income gets lower. Therefore, the income standard is the
synonym for disregard of the quasi-public good.
In the third model, the local standard, the consumer uses a weighted arith-
metic average of the disregard, (1   ), and the importance ratio, , of the
quasi-public good to evaluate themselves. The weight of the importance ratio
is the local average of the importance ratio of the neighbouring agents. The
evaluation standard is dened by the following equation:
V Lij (t) = (1  hi(t)i) (1  ij(t)) + hi(t)iij(t) ; (1)
where
{ V Lij (t): the evaluation of the jth consumer of the ith consumer's neighbour
at the tth period in the local standard model,
{ hi(t)i: the average of  of 8 consumers in the neighbour of the ith consumer
at the tth period,
{ ij (t): the importance ratio of the jth consumer of the ith consumer's neigh-
bour at the tth period.
In the fourth model, the glocal standard, the consumers use both global
and local information to evaluate themselves. While the local information is the
same as the local standard model, hi(t)i, the global information is the average
of invest ratios, s of all the corporations' and is used only for the weight of the
importance ratio term. That is,
V GLij (t) = (1  hi(t)i) (1  ij(t)) + (hi(t)i+ h(t  1)i)ij(t) ; (2)
where
{ V GLij (t): the evaluation of the jth consumer of the ith consumer's neighbour
at the tth period in the glocal standard model,
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{ h(t   1)i: the average of invest ratio  of all corporations at the (t   1)th
period.
We use social learning, i.e., imitation, for the adaptive change of agents'
preferences. The reason why we take social learning is that we consider agents
as social individuals that the individuals' ways of thought, including values,
preferences and cognitive frameworks, develop through interactions with others
in a society[2]. In each adaptive model, if a consumer takes the lowest in the
neighbour according to the standard, he/she imitates the importance ratio of
the highest consumer in the surrounding. The imitated value is perturbed by a
normal random number with 0 mean and 0.1 standard deviation.
3 Simulation Results
We summarise the results of computer simulations of the above four models. The
sizes of the corporation plane and the consumer plane are 1010 and 100100,
respectively. Thus, the total number of corporations and consumers are 100 and
10000, respectively. The initial states of the invest ratios and the importance
ratios are prepared with a uniform distribution.
There is no interesting phenomenon in the xed preference and the income
standard models. In the xed preference model, the CSR is not disseminated.
A little corporations takes high invest ratio. But that is a mere reection of the
existence of the consumers with high importance ratio prepared by the initial
uniform distribution. This result is qualitatively equivalent to an economic the-
oretical model [3]. This is a reasonable consequence since the xed preference is
the equivalent setting to the presumption of the standard economic theory.
Since the income standard means disregard of the quasi-public good, as we
mentioned already, the society is occupied by the consumers with very low impor-
tance ratio in the income standard model. As they select cheap price products,
the corporations also take the low invest strategy in the quasi-public good. The
CSR fades away.
3.1 Local Standard Model
In the local standard model, the frequencies of the corporations' invest ratios
and that of the consumers' importance ratios change with time as shown in
Fig. 1. These graphs represent the dynamics of histograms with 0.1 bin width.
The consumers converge to a distribution in which both large (  0:8) and
small (  0:2) importance ratios have greater volumes. Other importance ra-
tios are almost even. On the other hand, the corporations continually change
their invest ratios. They pursue popularity share by changing their strategies.
If a corporation has a top popularity, surrounding corporations come to take
the similar invest ratio to the top corporation. As the number of corporations
increase at the ratio range of the top popularity, they share the consumers. As
a consequence, the popularity of each corporation at this ratio range declines.
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Fig. 1. The dynamics of the frequency of the corporations' invest ratios (upper) and
that of the consumers' importance ratios (lower) in the local standard model. The x
axis is the period and the y axis is the number of agents. The color legend is shown at
the right upper corner.
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By keeping such popularity seeking action, the frequency of the invest ratio does
not converge to a xed state.
Figure 2 shows the spatial conguration of the consumers' importance ratio
in their two-dimensional plane. Interestingly, the plane converge to an inho-
mogeneous state. The consumers with high importance ratio (blue) and those
with low ratio (red) form clusters. The intermediate ratio consumers are at the
boundaries of two types of clusters.
Fig. 2. The spatial distribution of the consumers' importance ratios in the local stan-
dard model at the 500th period. The color legend is shown at the right of the gure.
The results shown here are similar to the reality. An empirical investigation
says that consciousness about CSR and environment-friendliness is stratied in
a society [4]. There are individuals with high consciousness followed by middle
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and low. People with high consciousness often form groups. People inside of the
group have strong relationships.
The spatial inhomogeneity remains because the consumer agents in the local
standard model refer local (their surrounding) consumers to evaluate themselves,
that is hi(t)i. There is no absolute standard. Under this circumstance, such a
situation occurs that an agent A is the lowest rank according to an agent B's
standard, but the agent B is the lowest rank according to the agent A's standard.
In this situation, both agents do not have incentives to change themselves, thus
the inhomogeneity and diversity are maintained.
Although the observed phenomena is realistic as well as interesting, and
corporations with high invest ratio exist to some extent, the ratio of them is not
enough. We conclude that CSR is not disseminated in the local standard model.
3.2 Glocal Standard Model
The change of the frequency of the corporations' invest ratios and that of the
consumers' importance ratios are depicted in Fig. 3. In this case, very large
importance ratio (  0:9) permeates rapidly among the consumers. Behind the
consumers movement, corporations with very large invest ratio (  0:9) also
increase and nally occupy the society. We consider this state as CSR established.
The spatial distribution of the consumers' importance ratios has islands in which
consumers having very low importance ratio are at the core (Fig. 4).
We introduce the average of invest ratio of all corporation as global informa-
tion into the weight for the second term of the evaluation standard (refer to eq.
(2)) that puts importance on CSR, but not into that of disregarding CSR (rst
term of eq. (2)). This is a trick to expand large invest ratios. The mechanism to
disseminate CSR is the followings:
1. There are consumers with high importance ratios to some extent.
2. Such consumers choose corporations with high invest ratio.
3. In order to improve popularity, corporations imitate the strategies of the
chosen corporations.
4. As a result, the average of the corporations' invest ratio, h(t)i, increases.
5. The weight of the CSR-seeking term in the glocal evaluation standard, refer
to eq. (2), increases and the social learning by the consumers is directed to
higher importance ratio.
6. The consumers are likely to increase their importance ratio. (back to 2.)
This is a positive feedback mechanism between the corporations' popularity
seeking behaviour and the consumers' social learning. In this feedback loop, the
consumers' CSR-seeking preference is evaluated according to both the local av-
erage of the preferences and the global average of all corporations' investment
in CSR, and then the consumers learn socially, i.e., imitate locally. As a phe-
nomenon level, this positive feedback is also observed as a mutual strengthen
between the consumers' consciousness putting importance on CSR and the cor-
porates' investment in the quasi-public good. Here, the important point is that
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Fig. 3. The dynamics of the frequency of the corporations' invest ratios (upper) and
that of the consumers' importance ratios (lower) in the glocal standard model. The x
axis is the period and the y axis is the number of agents. The color legend is shown at
the right upper corner.
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Fig. 4. The spatial distribution of the consumers' importance ratios in the glocal stan-
dard model. The color legend is shown at the right of the gure.
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the corporations take just myopic actions, popularity seeking. The spread of the
importance of CSR in the consumers precedes the strategy of corporations. That
is, an institution to putting importance on CSR establishes in the sub-parts of
consumer society rst. The corporations pursue the institution, and this action
promotes an atmosphere or a public opinion that CSR is important. The atmo-
sphere, then, boosts the consumers' change to higher importance ratio through
social learning.
4 Institutional Design
If the positive feedback mechanism works well, even in the society under an
objectionable state, that is, only with low importance ratio consumers, CSR
may be disseminated. We are able to also consider an institutional design in
which a policy is employed to realise a desirable social state. Here we suppose a
policy to regulate all corporations to maintain the least ratio of the investment
in the quasi-public good.
We investigate how CSR is established by controlling the minimum value of
the invest ratio of the corporations and the maximum value of the importance
ratio of the consumers at the initial state. The former corresponds to the strength
of the regulation by the policy and the latter the desirability of social state. We
calculate the average of the consumers' importance ratio at the nal (converged)
state. While the denition of the establishing CSR in this paper is maintaining
the higher invest ratio in a quasi-public good by the corporations, we observe
the state of the consumer society, since we already know that establishing the
institutions in the consumers leads the dissemination of CSR.
In Fig.5, the result of this calculation is shown. We can see two regions,
establishment of CSR (the value of z is 1.0) and complete loss of CSR (the value
of z is 0.0). There is a steep cli between these two regions. This is because
there is a threshold for the positive feedback mechanism above mentioned to
work. This result suggests that if the social state is not so desirable but not too
objectionable, say the maximum of  is 0.6, the regulation by the policy need
not to be so strong, the minimum  is 0.3.
In order to disseminate and establish CSR, we need to constitute a society
like the fourth model, the glocal standard model. But the reality at the present
seems to be in the third model, the local standard. The dierence is whether
people take the global information such as an atmosphere putting importance on
CSR into consideration to evaluate themselves. From the viewpoint of institu-
tional design, a possible way for the shift from the local to the glocal standard is
to give publicity to the present status of corporations' CSR activities by munici-
pality or government. When we successfully shift to the society supposed by the
glocal standard model, there are two scenarios. One is an optimistic scenario in
which CSR disseminate and is established by itself if there are consumers with
enough high consciousness about CSR. The other is less optimistic one, we need
a regulation on corporations activities to make a least level of investment in a
quasi-public good, if there is not enough high conscious people.
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Fig. 5. The eect of regulation and the initial social state on the dissemination of CSR.
The left axis is the minimum of the regulated invest ratio of the corporations, the right
axis is the maximum of the initial importance ratio of the consumers, and the z axis
is the average of the importance ratios of the consumers (averaged in 5 simulations).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a mechanism to disseminate CSR activities, a normative
action by corporations. The CSR is conceptualised as providing a quasi-public
good simultaneously in addition to a private good. Using multi-agent simula-
tions, we showed that the criteria to disseminate CSR were to take global in-
formation such as the average amount of investment in CSR into consideration
to evaluate consumers themselves. The dissemination mechanism is a positive
feedback between the consumers' social leaning of their preference putting im-
portance on CSR and the corporates' popularity seeking. We also showed that by
regulating the least amount of investment in CSR by corporates, dissemination
could be launched even in an objectionable society.
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